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We examine commonly observed forms of payment, such as milestones, royalties, or consulting contracts
as ways of engaging inventors in the development of licensed inventions. Our theoretical model shows
that when milestones are feasible, royalties are not optimal unless the licensing firm is risk averse.
The model also predicts the use of consulting contracts which improve the firm's ability to monitor
inventor effort. Because these contracts increase the firm's expected profits, the upfront fee that the
university can charge is higher than otherwise. These results therefore support the commonly observed
university policy of allowing faculty to consult with licensing firms outside of their university contracts.
They also support firm policies of including milestones. An empirical analysis based on a survey of
112 businesses that license-in university inventions supports the complementarity of milestones and
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University-generated knowledge is critical to industrial innovation, but the transfer of
this knowledge is fraught with incentive problems, largely because of the embryonic
nature of university inventions (Dechenaux et al. 2008 and Thursby and Thursby
2008). The overwhelming majority of inventions licensed require further development
which often requires inventor e®ort as well as licensee investment. In their survey of 62
U.S. universities, Thursby et al. (2001) found that half of the inventions licensed were
merely a proof of concept and another 25% were no more than a lab scale prototype.
Moreover, technology licensing personnel estimated that 71% of the inventions required
inventor cooperation in order to be successfully commercialized.1 In this paper we focus
on the role of license contracts in solving the moral hazard problem that arises when
inventor cooperation is important for development.
Faculty inventors are motivated to work for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
reasons. While they care about income, their research is also often curiosity driven
and therefore motivated by the love of puzzle solving as well as a desire for reputation
(Dasgupta and David, 1994, Levin and Stephan, 1991, and Thursby et al., 2007).
Thus, to the extent that faculty inventors prefer to solve new puzzles rather than
develop existing inventions, obtaining cooperation requires ¯nancial incentives tied to
development. Recent studies have examined these incentives in the context of royalties
or equity contracts (Jensen and Thursby, 2002 and Lach and Schankerman, 2008).
In this paper, we examine the extent to which commonly observed forms of pay-
ment, such as milestones, or consulting contracts dominate royalties as a means of
engaging inventors in development. In contrast to prior studies which examine the
problem from the perspective of the university, we examine desired forms of payment
from the licensing ¯rm's perspective. We also provide an empirical analysis based on
a survey of 112 businesses that license-in university inventions. The survey explored
the types of inventions licensed, the need for inventor cooperation in development, and
the importance of contract types for various kinds of inventions. The survey showed
that contracts typically involve a mixture of payment types including royalties and
milestones, and when inventor cooperation is critical to development, the majority of
licenses include additional consulting contracts.
We ¯rst construct a model of university licensing which allows us to develop hy-
potheses about the use of milestones, royalties, and consulting. As do Dechenaux et
al. (2008) in a di®erent context, we ¯nd that when milestones are feasible, royalties
can be optimal only when the licensee is risk averse. The reason is that, while royalties
1For when inventor involvement is and is not used see Colyvas et al. (2002), Thursby and Thursby
(2004 and 2008), and Agrawal (2006).
1provide an incentive for inventor e®ort, they also distort output, while milestones do
not. Importantly for the empirical analysis, we also show that milestone payments are
positively related to the importance of inventor e®ort in the development process. The
model also predicts that consulting contracts will be used to engage the inventor when
such contracts su±ciently improve the ¯rm's ability to monitor inventor e®ort. Because
these contracts increase the ¯rm's expected pro¯ts, the upfront fee that the university
can charge is higher than otherwise. These results therefore support the commonly
observed university policy of allowing faculty to consult with licensing ¯rms outside of
their university contracts. They also support ¯rm policies of including milestones.
In the empirical analysis, we examine survey responses to a series of questions on
the use of di®erent payment types for early and late stage inventions, as well as when
inventor cooperation is and is not critical. Analysis of these responses shows that
milestones are perceived to be most important for assuring inventor cooperation, while
also playing a secondary role in risk sharing. Royalties do not appear to be used to
address moral hazard, nor are they signi¯cantly more prevalent for the riskier, early-
stage inventions. We conjecture that their risk sharing role is mitigated by di±culties
in de¯ning them for early stage inventions. The survey also includes data on consulting
contracts in relation to the need for inventor cooperation. Our analysis of these data
support the complementarity of milestones and consulting suggested by the theory.
These results contribute to the theoretical literature on the role of faculty inven-
tors in technology commercialization, which has primarily focused on simple contracts.
Jensen and Thursby (2001) showed that without either royalties or equity, faculty in-
ventors who prefer research to development would not become engaged. They also
show that inventor e®ort is increasing in the inventor's share of royalty payments
made to the university.2 Dechenaux et al. (2008) examines the use of a variety of
payment types, including not only milestones, but also annual payments, royalties,
and upfront fees. They do not examine consulting, but more importantly, their anal-
ysis focuses primarily on the complicated nature of contracts when shelving by the
licensee is a problem, which we do not address here. Finally, in a simple model of the
licensor/licensee relationship, Crama et al. (2008) also show that licensor risk aver-
sion, incomplete and imperfect information all play an important role in determining
optimal contracts when upfront fees, milestone payments and royalties are feasible. A
crucial di®erence between this study and Crama et al.'s analysis is the absence of an
independent inventor who must receive adequate payments in order to be willing to
invest in further development. Thus, although their analysis is closely related to ours,
their model does not take into account the existence of inventor moral hazard, which
2For empirical studies on the relation between royalty shares, royalty income, and faculty behavior
see Lach and Schankerman (2008) and Agrawal (2006). On equity, see also Feldman et al. (2002).
2we believe is an important characteristic of the university licensing environment.
Very few studies, either empirical or theoretical, consider consulting. Notable ex-
ceptions include Mans¯eld (1995) and Cohen et al. (1998) who provide survey evidence
that both faculty and industry personnel ¯nd technology transfer by this mechanism
to be important. Beath et al. (2003) provide a theoretical analysis of the potential
for budget-constrained universities to relax the constraint by encouraging faculty to
consult. The work closest to ours is Thursby et al. (2007) and Jensen et al. (2008)
which examine consulting as a mechanism behind faculty inventors listed on industrial
patents. Jensen et al. (2008) provide a theoretical model that examines the trade-o®
between faculty consulting on industrial research projects and their research within
their university. The primary di®erence between their work and ours is that we con-
sider ex post development on a project licensed from the university, while they examine
consulting that is ex ante research by a faculty member on an industrial project. In
terms of Perkmann and Walsh's (2008) classi¯cation, we examine commercialization-
driven consulting, in contrast to opportunity or research-driven consulting.
We also contribute to the empirical licensing literature which has, like the theo-
retical literature, focused primarily on ¯xed fees and royalties (Taylor and Silberston
1973, Caves et al. 1983, Rostoker 1983, Macho-Stadler et al. 1996, and Bousquet
et al. 1998). An exception is Edwards et al. (2003) which provides evidence on the
frequency of milestones and other fees in biotechnology licenses. With the exception
of Arora et al. (2001), Anand and Khanna (2000), and Elfenbein (2004), few studies
provide econometric models.3 The study closest to ours is Elfenbein's which examines
the likelihood of termination of licenses for Harvard inventions as a function of royal-
ties and milestone payments. His analysis di®ers substantially from ours as it is purely
empirical and abstracts from the role of di®erent distortions in explaining the use of
royalties and milestones.
Section 2 provides survey results to motivate our consideration of multiple develop-
ment stages as well as our characterization of risk and the need for inventor cooperation
in development. Section 3 develops a simple model of contracts as a function of in-
ventor cooperation and risk. In Section 4 we test several implications of the model
using survey responses on the importance of contract terms with and without the need
for inventor cooperations, as well as for early and late stage inventions. Section 5
concludes.
3Arora et al. (2001) examines the complementarity of know-how transferred and patent rights for
import agreements in India from 1950-75, but does not examine license payment terms. Anand and
Khanna (2000) examine license contracts from a data base of strategic alliances with at least one
U.S. participant from 1990-93. The characteristics they examine include exclusivity, cross-licensing,
ex ante versus ex post transfer, and prior relationships of licensors and licensees.
3Stage Percentage Faculty
of development of cases involvement
Proof of concept (no prototype) 38 % 55 %
Prototype (only lab scale) 36 % 54 %
Preclinical stage 15 % 38 %
Clinical stage 5 % 18 %
Manufacturing feasibility known 9 % 15 %
Ready for practical or commercial use 7 % 15 %
Table 1: Stage of development at the time of license and faculty involvement at that
stage.
2 Stage of development and faculty participation
Our business survey largely agrees with earlier university surveys in showing the em-
bryonic nature of university inventions licensed, but it also provides more information
on the relation between stage of development, risk, and faculty participation. As shown
in Table 1, our respondents estimated that 38% of the inventions they licensed were
no more than a proof of concept, and an additional 36% no more than a lab-scale
prototype at the time of license. They reported knowing manufacturing feasibility for
only 9% of the inventions. No more than 7% were considered ready for commercial
use, so that at least 93% of the inventions licensed required further development by
the licensee.
We asked respondents the percentage of time that faculty were involved in further
development for licensed inventions in di®erent stages of development. For technologies
that were only a proof of concept, respondents indicated that faculty were used 55%
of the time. Faculty were used for 54% of technologies for which a laboratory-scale
prototype was available. If the technology was either ready for use or its manufacturing
feasibility was known, faculty were involved only 15% of the time. When faculty were
considered important for further development, respondents were asked why this was
the case. Not surprisingly, specialized knowledge of faculty inventors was given as the
most important reason, cited by 66% of respondents.
This development is clearly risky. Respondents reported that roughly half of the
inventions they license from universities failed in the sense that the technology did not
¯t the need anticipated at the time of license. The average failure rate reported for
inventions licensed as a proof of concept or lab-scale prototype was 72%, while the
average for inventions ready for commercial use was 43%.4 The correlation between
4The mean reported is the mean percentage weighted by the number of license deals.
4the reported failure rate and the fraction of licenses that are a proof of concept is 0.31,
while the correlation of the failure rate with the fraction ready for commercial use is
-0.23.
3 A model of university licensing
Consider a university invention which is available for license from a university technol-
ogy licensing o±ce (TLO). The invention requires further development before it can be
commercialized. There are two stages of development, which are characterized either
by uncertainty or imperfect information or both. In the ¯rst stage, inventor e®ort and
¯rm investment are needed to determine technical success of the invention, and in the
second stage, the ¯rm invests in commercialization. The timing of events is shown in
Figure 1.
The probability of technical success is given by p(e;x) where e is inventor e®ort
and x is the ¯rm's investment. We assume the following
p(e;x) =
½
0 if x = 0 and e ¸ 0
p(1 ¡ bexp(¡e)) if x = X and e ¸ 0
where p 2 (0;1] and b 2 [0;1]. The probability p(e;x) is increasing in both arguments
and strictly concave as a function of e. The parameter b measures the importance of
the inventor's role in the development process. When b is equal to zero, the probability
of success depends solely on the ¯rm's investment and is equal to p if x = X and zero
otherwise. On the other hand, if b is equal to one, then e = 0 implies p(0;X) = 0.
That is, inventor e®ort is necessary for a positive probability of technical success. The
parameter p can be interpreted as a measure of the risk involved in developing the
invention. As p goes to zero, even if x = X, the probability of success goes to zero
for any given level of inventor e®ort. Early stage inventions are those with a low p
and possibly a large b. On the other hand, a late stage invention is one for which p is
close to one and b is close to zero. If the invention is a technical success, the project
moves to a commercial development stage in which the ¯rm may invest an amount C
in commercial development. If the ¯rm invests, the probability of commercial success
is equal to z. Otherwise, the invention is not commercialized.
The university owns and can exclusively license the invention and the TLO acts on
behalf of the university. We assume that the TLO maximizes expected utility given by
EUA = (1 ¡ ®) ~ R, where (1 ¡ ®) is the share of revenue that accrues to the university
or TLO and ~ R is the expected value of licensing revenue.5
5In order to focus on the moral hazard problem, we abstract from any agency problems with the
5The inventor's utility from license revenue is given by UI( ~ R) = ® ~ R: She incurs
strictly positive and increasing disutility of e®ort represented by the function V (e) =
exp(e).
The TLO o®ers the ¯rm an exclusive license contract that speci¯es all payment
terms. We denote a contract by O = (F;M;r;t): We restrict attention to the following
payment types. Payment term F is an upfront fee paid when the ¯rm accepts the
contract. Payment term M, which we refer to as a milestone payment, is a lump sum
fee paid if and only if technical development is successful. Finally, r is an output
royalty, and t is a pro¯t tax or alternatively, a share of the ¯rm's equity.6 Hereafter,
we refer to M, r and t as continuation payments, since the ¯rm would have to return
the license if it failed to make any of these payments.
The ¯rm's expected utility is given by its expected pro¯t net of license payments.
The ¯rm's pro¯t from selling a product based on the invention is equal to ¼(x) with x
denoting output. Where there is no ambiguity, we write ¼ for maxxf¼(x)g. Clearly, in
the absence of distortionary payments based on output, if the ¯rm commercializes the
invention, it chooses the optimal level of output and earns ¼. Thus, immediately after
technical success, the ¯rm's expected pro¯t is given by ¦[x¤(r;t);r;t] = maxfz[(1 ¡
t)¼[x¤(r;t)] ¡ rx¤(r;t)] ¡ C;0g, where x¤(r;t) is the ¯rm's optimal output level when
the royalty rate is r > 0 and the equity share is equal to t. If the ¯rm invests X at the
technical development stage, and behaves optimally at the commercialization stage,
its expected payo® is given by
p(e;X)[¦[x
¤(r;t);r;t] ¡ M] ¡ X ¡ F:
As others have shown in di®erent contexts, when inventor e®ort is not observ-
able, continuation payments are required to obtain positive e®ort from the inventor
(Dechenaux et al., 2008, Choi, 2001, Jensen and Thursby, 2001, Macho-Stadler et al.,
1996). Moreover, with risk neutrality, an output royalty is not optimal because it
creates a deadweight loss, which the TLO could avoid by using other payment types.
Finally, when the inventor is risk neutral, upfront fees do not a®ect his optimal level
of e®ort (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). Hence, for most of the analysis below, we focus
on continuation payments that exclude output royalties.
TLO and university, as well as multiple objectives on the part of either the university or TLO. See
Thursby et al. (2001), and Dechenaux et al. (2008) regarding other objectives.
6Note that Jensen and Thursby (2001) also consider F; r; and t: Bousquet et al. (1998) consider
upfront fees and royalties only. However, they allow for two di®erent types of royalties. One is an
output royalty, and the other is a tax on the ¯rm's revenue. We focus on output royalties, which is
without loss of generality in our model. Either type of royalty implies a distortion of the licensee's
output, which is what matters for our results. Because of the way we model uncertainty at the
commercialization stage, the distinction between the two di®erent types of royalties is inconsequential.
6There are di®erent ways to model the contract o®er game between the TLO and
the ¯rm. For instance, we could follow Jensen and Thursby (2001) and Dechenaux
et al. (2008) and assume that the TLO makes a take-it-or-leave it o®er to the ¯rm.
Instead, we assume that the ¯rm has enough bargaining power to obtain the set of
continuation payments that maximizes its expected pro¯t. The TLO then bargains
with the ¯rm over the size of the upfront fee. If we assume that the ¯rm and the
TLO engage in Nash bargaining with threat points equal to zero, then the size of the
upfront fee is equal to the bargaining power of the TLO times the ¯rm's pro¯t (gross
of the fee, but net of continuation payments.) It follows that the level of continuation
payments is the solution to the ¯rm's expected pro¯t maximization problem. This
approach is in line with the survey data we use in the empirical analysis. In the
survey, we asked businesses to rate the importance of payment types depending on
various characteristics of the licensed technology.
Consider a contract O = fF;M;r;tg. For now, suppose that r = 0 in all contracts.7
This implies the ¯rm earns ¼ from commercializing. Following technical success, it will
be willing to invest C in commercial development if and only if the equity payment
is not too high. Speci¯cally, t must be such that z(1 ¡ t)¼ ¡ C ¸ 0, which implies
t < ^ t ´ 1 ¡ C
z¼. With t < ^ t and for given e, the ¯rm's expected payo® if it invests X
in technical development is given by
p(e;X)(z¼ ¡ C ¡ zt¼ ¡ M) ¡ X ¡ F:
The inventor's expected utility is given by
(1 ¡ ®)p(e;X)(zt¼ + M) ¡ V (e):
It is clear that for both the ¯rm and the inventor, incentives to invest depend only on
the sum of continuation payments and not on each payment type separately. Thus we
introduce the notation S ´ zt¼ + M.
3.1 Optimal inventor e®ort and optimal level of continuation
payments
Given the contract O, the inventor will choose his e®ort so as to maximize his expected
utility. Using p(e;X) = and V (e) = exp(e) and solving the inventor's expected utility
maximization problem, we obtain e¤ = 1
2 ln(pb®S).
7It is straightforward to show that when all three players are risk neutral, for every contract with
r >, there exists another contract with r = 0 that raises the same amount of revenue from continuation
payments, but leads to higher e®ort and higher ¯rm pro¯t.
7We note the following regarding the inventor's optimal level of e®ort. First, it is
clearly increasing in p, the baseline probability of technical success. It is also increasing
in b, the importance of the inventor's role, in ®, the inventor's share of revenue, and
of course in S, the sum of continuation payments. Second, note that although we
have ruled out output royalties, if such a royalty were part of the contract, it would
generate royalty revenue equal to rx¤(r). In this case, the inventor's optimal e®ort level
would be equal to e¤¤ = 1
2 ln[pb®(S + zrx¤(r))]. Hence, royalty revenue and milestone
revenue (for instance) are perfect substitutes in inventor e®ort. It follows that, for
every contract with r > 0, there exists another contract with r = 0, a higher milestone
payment and the same e®ort level. The contract with r = 0 would also generate strictly
higher ¯rm expected pro¯t since it does not generate an output distortion.
Since we assume the ¯rm chooses the continuation payments to maximize its ex-
pected pro¯t, with r = 0, the optimal value of S, S¤, solves the following:
Maximize p(e
¤;X)(z¼ ¡ C ¡ S) ¡ X ¡ F with respect to S:
The ¯rst order condition for an interior solution S¤ simpli¯es to
1
2
p(bz¼ ¡ bC + bS
¤ ¡ 2S
¤p
pb®S¤) = 0: (1)
The objective function is strictly concave as a function of S for S > 0, thus, there exists
a unique solution. If X is low enough, it is optimal for the ¯rm to accept a contract in
which continuation payments sum up to S¤. Otherwise, the ¯rm will reject the TLO's
contract. If it is optimal for the ¯rm to accept the license contract, its payo® gross of
the upfront fee is equal to P ¤ ´ p(e¤;X)(z¼ ¡ C ¡ S¤) ¡ X. We make the following
assumption to simplify the exposition of our results.
Assumption 1: If a contract speci¯es continuation payments which add up to an
amount S¤, then the ¯rm is willing to pay a positive upfront fee to obtain the li-
cense from the TLO under these contract terms. That is, we restrict attention to
values of (p;b;X;¼;z;C) for which P ¤ ¸ 0.
Although a closed-form solution for S¤ exists, its equation is not particularly in-
sightful. Under Assumption 1, we derive comparative statics results summarized in
Proposition 1 below. The proof appears in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Assume the TLO, the ¯rm and the inventor are risk neutral. Under
Assumption 1, the optimal value of continuation payments is equal to S¤, with royalty
rate set equal to zero. The optimal sum of continuation payments S¤ increases with the
8importance of inventor e®ort, (b), and decreases with the basic probability of success
(p). That is, dS¤
db > 0 and dS¤
dp < 0 hold.
The result that continuation payments increase with b, the importance of inventor
e®ort, is not surprising. With risk neutrality, the only purpose of including continuation
payments is to provide incentives for inventor e®ort. The result that the amount of
continuation payments decreases with p is not as straightforward. As p increases, two
e®ects work in opposite directions. The need for high inventor e®ort decreases because
the invention is less likely to fail at the technical development stage. This tends to
decrease the return from including continuation payments. However, the inventor will
also spend more e®ort for a given level of continuation payment since e¤ increases with
p, which tends to increase the return from continuation payments. The unambiguous
sign for dS
dp tells us that the ¯rst of the two e®ects always dominates.
3.2 Royalties and risk aversion
If royalties create a deadweight loss, while milestones do not, why do we observe
contracts that include both royalties and milestone payments? A natural explanation
is risk aversion on the part of the ¯rm (see Bousquet et al., 1998). In our model, the
worst state of nature for the ¯rm is one in which the invention is a technical success but
commercial success is not realized. In this case, the ¯rm has to pay the ¯xed fee plus
the milestone payment but earns no revenue from the invention. A positive royalty
rate will reduce the variance in the distribution of pro¯ts across states and so may be
optimal.
If the TLO o®ers a contract with r > 0 and M > 0 but t = 0, then the inventor
will optimally choose e®ort level e¤¤ = ln[pb®(M + zrx¤(r))], where rx¤(r) is royalty
revenue. Suppose that the ¯rm is risk averse and has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function over money given by Uf(w), where U0
f(w) > 0 and U00
f(w) < 0. Under our
assumptions that the ¯rm has su±cient bargaining power to obtain the continuation
payments that maximize its expected payo® and that the TLO and the ¯rm bargain
over the size of the upfront fee, the ¯rm will choose r and M to solve
Maximize p(e
¤¤;X)[zUf(P1) + (1 ¡ z)Uf(P2)] + (1 ¡ p(e
¤¤;X))Uf(P3);
with respect to M and r, where P1 = [¼[x¤(r)] ¡ rx¤(r)] ¡ C ¡ M) ¡ X ¡ F, P2 =
¡C¡M ¡X ¡F, and P3 = ¡F. In the Appendix, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume the TLO and the inventor are risk neutral, but the ¯rm is
risk averse and has vNM utility function Uf(w). Also assume that equity contracts are
9not feasible. Then, if an optimal contract exists, it must include both a positive royalty
rate and a positive milestone payment, r > 0 and M > 0.
Therefore, according to Proposition 2, when the ¯rm is risk averse, but the TLO and
the inventor are risk neutral, a positive royalty rate, milestone and an upfront fee may
coexist. It is straightforward to show that the positive risk spreading e®ect of royalties
is more pronounced the lower z is. Therefore, technologies for which commercialization
is highly improbable are those for which royalties are important from the licensee's
standpoint.
3.3 The role of consulting
The contracts o®ered by the TLO are constrained because a given share ® of revenue
must be allocated to the inventor. Consider then a consulting contract between the
¯rm and the inventor, whereby the inventor receives the full consulting fee in the
contract. Suppose that after the ¯rm has accepted the TLO's contract, but before it
and the inventor invest in further technical development, the ¯rm can o®er a consulting
contract to the inventor.
Assume again that all players are risk neutral. To understand the intuition behind
the role of consulting, and show that a consulting contract may be pro¯table, assume
for now that the original contract consists of the upfront fee negotiated by the TLO and
the ¯rm, as well as the set of continuation payments whose sum equals S¤ as de¯ned in
Section 3.1. We assume that a consulting contract consists of a required e®ort level, ec,
and a payment, K, to the inventor. Consulting does not make e®ort fully observable.
However, it allows the ¯rm to monitor the inventor. The ¯rm monitors the inventor's
e®ort and, with probability m, observes the actual e®ort spent. If monitoring reveals
that e < ec, then the inventor does not receive K. In all other cases, the inventor
receives K. The consulting contract will be pro¯table only if ec > e¤.
Suppose the inventor accepts the ¯rm's consulting o®er and decides to expand e®ort
level e = ec > e¤. Then, his expected payo® is equal to
p(e
c;X)(1 ¡ ®)S
¤ + K ¡ V (e
c):
On the other hand, if the inventor's e®ort is e¤ < ec, his expected payo® is
p(e
¤;X)(1 ¡ ®)S




®S¤(p(e¤;X) ¡ p(ec;X)) ¡ V (e¤) + V (ec)
m
= K; (2)
10must hold for the inventor to spend e®ort ec.
Why would the ¯rm bene¯t from the consulting contract? If the ¯rm does not o®er
the consulting contract, its expected payo® is equal to
p(e;X)(z¼ ¡ C ¡ S
¤) ¡ X:
with e = e¤. The fact that X > 0 implies z¼¡C ¡S¤ > 0. Hence, this payo® function
is clearly increasing in e for given S¤. Thus, if the ¯rm can obtain an e®ort level e > e¤
from the inventor, then its payo® will be higher than without the consulting contract.
If (2) holds, the ¯rm's payo® with the consulting contract in e®ect is equal to
p(e
c;X)(z¼ ¡ C ¡ S
¤) ¡ K ¡ X: (3)
The optimal consulting contract is (ec;Kc), where Kc = K and ec maximizes the ¯rm's
payo®. The following proposition, whose proof appears in the Appendix, characterizes
the ¯rm's optimal contract when consulting is feasible.
Proposition 3 Assume the TLO, the ¯rm and the inventor are risk neutral and that
Assumption 1 holds. Also assume that consulting contracts between the ¯rm and the
inventor are allowed by the University. Then, the ¯rm always o®ers a consulting
contract to the inventor. If ® · m, then the ¯rm's optimal contract is such that
S = 0 and K =
V (ec)
m . That is, incentives for inventor e®ort are provided solely by
the consulting contract. If ® > m, then the ¯rm's optimal contract includes S > 0
and K > 0. That is, incentives for inventor e®ort are provided both by continuation
payments and a consulting contract.
An optimal consulting contract always exists and leads to a higher payo® for the
¯rm. Therefore, it will allow the TLO to obtain a higher upfront fee in the bargaining
game because the upfront fee is equal to a share of the ¯rm's expected payo®. It
follows that the TLO will not prevent consulting agreements between the ¯rm and the
inventor and thus, the ¯rm will o®er the consulting contract in equilibrium.
4 Empirical results
Our theoretical analysis yields the following empirical implications. First, in the con-
text of our model, if the ¯rm is risk neutral, royalties will not be part of an optimal
contract since other types of continuation payments provide incentives for inventor ef-
fort, but do not create an output distortion. Furthermore, according to Proposition 1,
the ¯rm will prefer milestone payments and equity when inventor cooperation is needed
11(b is high). Interpreting p as a measure of the di±culty of reaching technical success,
the less di±cult technical development is, the less important continuation payments
like milestone payments and equity are.
Proposition 2 yields empirical implications pertaining to the risk involved in devel-
oping the technology. When ¯rms are risk averse, output royalties are an important
component of contracts if there is a high level of uncertainty at the commercialization
stage and equity deals are not feasible. On the other hand, even with ¯rm risk aver-
sion, when commercialization occurs with certainty conditional on the invention being
a technical success (z = 1), then output royalties are not optimal from the ¯rm's point
of view. Proposition 2 also implies that milestone payments may also serve as a risk
sharing device at the technical development stage. Hence, other things constant, risk
averse ¯rms will ¯nd milestone payments important when they license in early stage
inventions.
Finally, according to Proposition 3, consulting contracts are always feasible because
they allow the ¯rm to request more e®ort from the inventor, which increases the surplus
from investing in development by an amount that exceeds the additional e®ort cost.
The pro¯tability of a consulting agreement increases as the probability that the ¯rm
can successfully monitor the inventor's e®ort (m) increases. Hence, it is more likely
that consulting contracts will be observed in contexts where it is easier for the ¯rm to
monitor the inventor.
4.1 Inventor moral hazard, risk, and payment types
To provide information on business attitudes toward risk and payment types, we asked
respondents the importance to them of di®erent payment types for early stage tech-
nologies and for late stage technologies. To provide information on business attitudes
toward inventor cooperation, we asked the importance to them of di®erent payment
types when faculty input is critical and when it is not critical.8 The questions are
given in Table 2. Immediately below each question respondents were asked to indicate
using a 5 point Likert scale from 5 (extremely important) to 1 (not important) the
importance of several payment types including royalties, milestones and equity. Thus,
for each of the four questions in Table 2 we have the importance attached to each of
three payment types. That is, each respondent could provide up to 12 answers: the
importance of each of three payments types for each of four technology characteristics.
Out of 112 respondents to the survey, 91 answered at least some of the questions (58%
provided at least one answer to each question), but not all respondents noted the im-
8The intent here was to discern business attitudes. Thus alternative measures such as the portion
of contracts with various payment types would not be useful since it is an equilibrium result and hence
also re°ect university attitudes and negotiation.
12portance of each of the payment types.9 Overall, royalties are always more important
than the other payment types, this is followed by milestone payments and then equity.
The average given by respondents regarding the importance of royalties is 3.7 while
importance for milestones and equity is 2.9, and 1.7, respectively.
To examine the relative importance of payment types in the circumstances outlined
in the questions in Table 2, we consider three regressions in which the dependent vari-
able is the importance a respondent attaches to a particular payment type (royalties,
milestone payments, equity) as a function of a set of dummy variables that indicate
the question being answered (early stage technology, late stage technology, faculty are
critical, faculty are not critical). The equations we estimate are of the form
Rip = ¯0p+¯1pEARLYip+¯3pCRITip+¯4pNOTCRITip+"ip; i = 1;:::;n; p = 1;:::;3:
Rip is the importance attached by individual i to payment type p, EARLYip = 1 if the
question is the one where the technology is in an early stage (0 otherwise), CRITip = 1
if the question is the one where the technology is one for which faculty input is critical
(0 otherwise), and NOTCRITip = 1 if the question is the one where faculty input
is not critical (0 otherwise). The omitted category is the case where the question is
about late stage technologies. These equations take a particular payment type (e.g.,
royalties) and then consider responses across the four questions listed in Table 2.
Since the responses are ordinal from 5, extremely important, to 1, not important, we
use an ordered probit estimator. With each respondent appearing in each equation up
to four times (that is, we have a panel of data) we use a ¯xed e®ects estimator to control
for unobserved heterogeneity across respondents. We consider both heteroschedastic
consistent (robust) estimates and estimates that are corrected for a speci¯c form of
heteroschedasticity. Regression results for each payment type are in Table 3. Part A
presents the robust ordered probit coe±cients along with t statistics and an indication
of the level of signi¯cance. Below each regression are chi-square statistics in tests for
equality of the coe±cients. Part B presents weighted least squares estimates where
the weights are the square root of the number of university licenses executed in the
year prior to the the survey.10 Respondents who execute more licenses should have a
clearer idea of relative importance of payment types so that their responses should be
subject to less noise. Results for the estimators are very similar.
9It is not surprising that many respondents left blank answers for some questions. For example, if
a ¯rm has never used faculty in further development, then they would be unable to answer questions
regarding the importance of payment types when faculty are critical and when faculty are not critical.
10We not only asked for the number of licenses executed in the year prior to the survey but also the
number of licenses executed in the ¯ve year period prior to the survey. Fewer respondents answered
the ¯ve year question thus we use the number of licenses in only the prior year. The simple correlation
between the the one year and the ¯ve year responses is 0.86.
13The results for milestones are clear: they are most important when faculty are crit-
ical. This is followed by early stage inventions, then late stage inventions (the omitted
category) which are not signi¯cantly di®erent from faculty not critical. The impor-
tance of milestones when faculty are critical supports our argument that milestones
serve to mitigate the moral hazard problem. The ¯nding that early stage inventions
are next most important (although the empirical results are weak) supports our theo-
retical result that milestones serve to share risk, though they can only serve to share
technical risk. Moreover, it suggests the negative correlation between the probability
of success and stage of development in our data dominates in the e®ect of risk on the
importance of milestones, as predicted by Proposition 1 (i.e., dS
dp < 0).
In the equation for royalties, we ¯nd that there is no signi¯cant di®erence in re-
sponses for the cases where faculty are critical and not critical. This result is consistent
with our theoretical results that when milestones are feasible, royalties should not be
used to solve the moral hazard problem. With regard to stage of development, we ¯nd
that royalties are more important for late stage than for early stage technologies. In
our data, the probability of success is lower for early stage technologies, so that the
theoretical result on risk aversion would suggest royalties as more important for early
stage technologies.11 However, the theoretical result assumes that royalties are feasible.
Many university inventions are so embryonic that downstream products cannot be de-
¯ned at the time of license and many inventions have a variety of applications (Shane,
2000). Thus, in contrast to Bousquet et al.'s (1998) presumption that milestones may
be hard to de¯ne, in the case of university licenses, royalties may be di±cult, if not im-
possible, to de¯ne. There are therefore two competing e®ects for royalties: risk sharing
which ceteris paribus would be more important for early stage technologies, and the
di±culty of determining royalty rates which would make them more important for late
stage technologies (which still re°ect market risk). Our empirical results suggest that
the latter e®ect dominates.
Finally, none of the coe±cients are signi¯cant in the equity equation. We suspect
this follows from the fact that for large, publicly traded companies, equity and cash
are essentially equivalent. We considered this regression after dropping large ¯rms, but
the results continued to be poor.
11In the university survey (Thursby et al. (2001)), we asked an open ended question about the use
of royalties. Thirty three percent said that royalties were always or almost always used except for
software or technologies for internal ¯rm use only. The most common reason listed for royalties listed
was dealing with risk. As one respondent said \... if we knew how much the invention was going to
make for the licensee - in advance - it would be quite reasonable to ask all royalties be paid up front."
144.2 The role of consulting
In Section 3.3, we showed that consulting and milestones can both address inventor
moral hazard. In our business survey, we asked respondents to indicate the percent-
age of the time faculty consulting was used when faculty input is critical for further
development. On average, respondents indicated that they used consulting 58.7% of
the time. There was, however, a lot of variation in responses. The standard deviation
was 34% and the range was from 0% to 100%. Some of this variation, we hypothesize,
is a function of the seriousness of the moral hazard problem faced by ¯rms.
Since our measure of consulting is a percentage, we make a standard adjustment
and use the log of the odds (that is, the logit) as the dependent variable. The odds is
the fraction of time consulting is used divided by one minus that fraction.12 To test
for the link between consulting and moral hazard, we regress the logit on, among other
factors, a measure of the moral hazard problem faced { or perceived to be faced { by
the ¯rm. The measure we use for moral hazard is the importance that ¯rms attach
to milestone payments when faculty are critical to further development. That is, we
use their response to milestones in question 3 in Table 3 (MILESTONE IMPORT).
If, as the results in the previous section suggest, respondents view milestones as a
mechanism for dealing with inventor moral hazard, then we argue the importance
of milestone payments is a measure of the respondent's perception of inventor moral
hazard faced by the ¯rm. Recall that respondents provide measures of importance
ranging from 5 (extremely important) to 1 (not important). In this analysis we do not
use the actual responses since respondents likely de¯ne levels of importance di®erently
{ for example, two respondents might view some payment type for some technology
as equally important, but one scores it as a \5" while the other scores it as a \4." To
get around this problem we compute the measure of importance as the deviation of a
response from the average response a respondent makes to all questions.13
Additional regressors include a dummy variable for small ¯rms (SMALL). Here
we de¯ne small as ¯rms with fewer than 100 employees. Our reason for including a
measure for size is based on discussions with university technology transfer professionals
who told us that it is more common for small ¯rms to use consulting as a means for
obtaining faculty input.
We also include a variable to measure distance of a ¯rm from the universities from
12Since the fraction of consulting can be 0 or 1 we follow Cox's (1970) suggestion and add a small
positive number to both the numerator and denominator of the odds ratio. This logit regression is
known to be heteroschedastic (see, for example, Maddala, 1983). Unfortunately, both the optimal
small number to add to consulting and the weights to correct for heteroschedascity require information
we do not have. To deal with the heteroschedascity we use robust standard errors.
13We do not need to make this adjustment for the econometric models considered earlier since a
¯xed e®ects model is used.
15whom they license (DISTANCE). The further a ¯rm is from the faculty inventor, the
more di±cult is a consulting arrangement. Note that a greater distance is likely to be
associated with a lower probability of successful monitoring of inventor e®ort by the
¯rm, that is, a lower m in our model. In our survey we asked for the ¯ve universities
most important in terms of licensing. Our measure of distance is the average distance
from the universities listed by each respondent.
The use of consulting may depend, in part, on the stage of development of the
technology. To control for stage of development, we include the percentage of the time
that the ¯rm licenses in technologies that are only a proof of concept (PROOF) and
the percentage of time that they license in technologies for which there is only a lab
scale prototype (PROTOTY PE). These are the two earliest stages for licensed in
technologies.
Finally, ¯rms may also use sponsored research to obtain faculty input. In our sur-
vey we not only asked about the percentage of time that consulting was used but also
the percentage of time sponsored research was used when faculty are critical. On aver-
age respondents indicated that they used sponsored research 43.1% of the time when
faculty are critical. Our ¯nal variable is the percentage of time sponsored research is
used (SPON RESEARCH). Sponsored research and consulting, while not mutually
exclusive, are very likely to be simultaneously determined; the more one is used the
less one would expect the other to be used. The simple correlation is -0.33. For that
reason we use two-stage least squares (with robust standard errors). The instrument
we use for sponsored research is the percentage of in-house research conducted by the
¯rm that is basic. In Thursby and Thursby (2004) we ¯nd a signi¯cant and positive
relationship between sponsored research and in-house basic research. In the limit, the
amount of basic research should be correlated with the amount of sponsored research
and uncorrelated with the disturbance.
In Table 4 are summary statistics for the 36 observations for which we have obser-
vations on all variables. Table 5 presents the econometric results. Robust standard
errors are used and results are in terms of the odds ratio. An odds ratio value less
than one indicates that an increase in the independent variable reduces the level of
consulting. In the ¯rst panel we include all regressors. PROOF has a t statistic of
only -0.25. In the second panel it is omitted. In spite of having only 36 observations for
which all data are available, we are nonetheless able to uncover signi¯cant relationships.
As expected sponsored research and consulting are negatively and statistically signi¯-
cantly (at the 5% level) related in both panels. Also, and as expected, the greater the
distance between the ¯rm and universities the less likely are consulting arrangements
(statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level). Small ¯rms are more likely to use consult-
ing in accordance with our interviews with technology transfer professionals; however,
16the coe±cient is not signi¯cant at conventional levels. The higher the percentage of
licensed-in technologies that are only a lab scale prototype (PROTOTY PE) the more
likely the ¯rm will use consulting, but the coe±cient is not signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero. Finally, the coe±cient of the importance attached to milestone payments when
faculty are critical is positive and signi¯cant at the 5% level, which we argue shows
that the more serious the moral hazard problem faced by the ¯rm, the more likely it
is to observe consulting contracts.
5 Conclusion
University-industry technology transfer is an important part of national innovation
systems and one fraught with incentive problems, largely because of the embryonic
nature of most university inventions. In this paper, we focus on the role of contracts,
and in particular the form of payment in overcoming the distortions introduced by the
need for inventor e®ort. Our theoretical and empirical results suggest that milestones
are prevalent because of inventor moral hazard. Royalties are not used to address
moral hazard and the risk sharing role of royalties is mitigated by di±culties in de¯ning
them for early stage inventions. They also suggest that consulting as a part of license
contracts is related to inventor moral hazard.
It is the university ownership of the invention that makes our contracting problems
fundamentally di®erent from those of Aghion and Tirole (1994). In our model the
researcher (inventor) has a moral hazard problem that does not exist in their framework
where either the researcher or the customer (licensee in our case) owns the invention.
However, it is well understood from principal-agent theory that if the agent is risk
neutral and faces no limited liability constraints, the principal can usually fully solve
the moral hazard problem by \selling" the project to the agent and extracting rent with
a ¯xed fee (see, for instance, La®ont, 1989). This solution is reminiscent of a commonly
observed practice in university licensing, which consists of letting the inventor start
up her own ¯rm to develop and commercialize the invention. An interesting question
for further research, particularly given increasing commercialization through inventor
startup companies, is when it would be optimal for the university to transfer ownership
to the inventor. This question has also been the topic of debate among a number
of European countries where traditionally ownership has resided with the inventor
(OECD 2003). Another question, currently a point of contention between some ¯rms
and universities, is when the ¯rm funds the research, whether ¯rm ownership is optimal.
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206 Appendix A: Proofs
6.1 Proposition 1
To show that a risk neutral ¯rm would never request a positive royalty rate from a
risk neutral TLO and risk neutral inventor, note that in e¤¤, r and M act as perfect
substitutes. Hence, for every r > 0, there exists an M0 such that a contract with r0 = 0
and M0 = 0 yields the same e®ort level as a contract with r > 0 and M ¸ 0. Since the
milestone payment does not create a deadweight loss, while the output royalty does,
the contract with r0 = 0 and M0 > 0 yields a greater expected revenue to the ¯rm.
Hence, in the remainder of the proof, we set r = 0.
The optimal value of S, the sum of continuation payment, is the solution to (??)
subject to the constraints S ¸ 0 and p(e;X)(z¼ ¡ C ¡ S) ¡ X ¸ 0. Ignoring this last
constraint, it is straightforward to show that the ¯rst order condition for an interior
solution simpli¯es to (1). Straightforward calculations yield that for S > 0, the second
derivative of the objective function is equal to ¡3z¼¡3C+S
4S2p
pb®S < 0. Hence, there exists a
unique solution S¤.
Now, assume that Assumption 1 holds. We apply the implicit function theorem to




S[b(z¼ ¡ C + S) ¡ 4S
p
pb®S]






S(z¼ ¡ C + S)
b(3z¼ ¡ 3C + S)
> 0: (5)
Since z¼¡C ¡S > 0, then, unambiguously, dS
db > 0. That dS
dp < 0 follows from the fact
that the denominator is positive, while using the ¯rst order condition (1), it is clear
that the numerator is negative.
6.2 Proposition 2
To show that the royalty rate will be strictly positive in the contract that is optimal for
the ¯rm, suppose that there exists M > 0 and F > 0 such that the ¯rm would accept
the contract O = (F;M) with r = 0 and invest X. Since equity contracts are not
feasible, S = M and the inventor's e®ort is equal to e¤¤ (with r = 0). Now, consider a
simultaneous marginal increase in r from r = 0 and a simultaneous marginal decrease
in M that keeps the inventor's e®ort constant at e¤¤. That is, consider changes dr
and dM such that zx(0)dr = ¡dM. If Uf is strictly concave, this will increase the
¯rm's expected payo® for z < 1. Indeed, setting r = 0, the small increase in royalty








Using zx(0)dr = ¡dM and re-arranging the above expression, we ¯nd that the change
in expected utility is strictly positive if and only if Uf is strictly concave.
We now show that if the ¯rm is willing to accept a contract O = (F;M;r), with
r > 0 and M = 0, then there exists a contract with M > 0 that leads to a strictly
higher expected pro¯t. Hence, the ¯rm will prefer a contract with M > 0. Note that
with contract O, the inventor spends e®ort e¤¤ (with M = 0).
The ¯rm's expected payo® is equal to
p(e
¤¤;X)[zUf(P1) + (1 ¡ z)Uf(P3)] + (1 ¡ p(e
¤¤;X))Uf(P3):
where P1 = [¼[x¤(r)] ¡ rx¤(r)] ¡ C) ¡ X ¡ F and P3 = ¡F.
Now consider marginal changes in F and M that keep licensing revenue constant.
That is consider dM and dF such that [p0(e;X) @e
@MM + p(e;X)]dM = ¡dF or, in the
limit as M goes to zero, p(e¤¤;X)dM = ¡dF, where dF < 0 and dM > 0. We show
that this change will lead to a higher expected payo® for the ¯rm.
Again, in the limit as M is close to zero, the total e®ect on the ¯rm's expected
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The strict inequality follows from Uf(P1) > Uf(P3) because Uf is increasing, dM > 0,
U0
f(P1) < U0
f(P3) because Uf is strictly concave, and dF < 0.
6.3 Proposition 3
In this section we prove Proposition 3 by characterizing the optimal consulting contract
for all values of ® and m. To this e®ect, note that if the ¯rm o®ers a consulting contract,
22given the chosen ec, it will set K = K. The optimal combination of continuation
payments and consulting contract maximizes the ¯rm's expected payo®
p(e
c;X)(z¼ ¡ C ¡ S
¤) ¡ K ¡ X
with respect to ec and S. Di®erentiating the ¯rm's expected payo® with respect to ec
and S, we obtain the following expressions.
p
0(e
c)(z¼ ¡ C ¡ S) +












We ¯rst show that if a solution exists, then ec > e¤ holds. To this e®ect, note that for
every S, the ¯rst term in 6 is strictly positive, while the second term vanishes in the
limit as ec goes to e¤. That is because e¤ maximizes the inventor's expected payo®.
Hence, if ec = e¤, (6) is strictly positive, which implies that the ¯rm could increase its
payo® by increasing ec.
Assume ® < m. Since if a solution exists, ec > e¤, in this case, it is straightforward
to see that (7) is strictly negative. It follows that the ¯rm will set S = 0. The optimal
value of ec is the solution of (6) set equal to zero. Setting S = 0 and di®erentiating (6)
yields p00(ec)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡
V 00(ec)
m < 0. Therefore, the second order condition is satis¯ed.
Finally, because S = 0, it follows that K =
V (ec)
m .
Now assume ® > m. From ec > e¤, at S = 0, (7) is equal to ( ®
m ¡ 1)p(ec) > 0
so that for every ec, the ¯rm can increase its expected payo® by increasing S above
0. We therefore look for an interior solution, where ec > e¤ and S > 0. At such a
solution, both (6) and (7) are equal to zero. To show that a solution exists, we use
the functional forms given in the text and solve the system of equations for ec and S
(recalling the expression for e¤). We obtain a unique solution.
We now show that the second order conditions hold. The Jacobian of the system




where A1 = p00(ec)(z¼ ¡C ¡S)+
p00(ec)®S¡V 00(ec)
m < 0, B1 = 0, A2 = ®¡m
m p0(ec) > 0, and
B2 = ®¡m
m p00(ec) < 0. Since A1 < 0 and A1B1 ¡ A2B2 > 0, the SOC holds.
Finally, assume ® = m. In this case, (7) is equal to zero at S = 0. However,
because ec > e¤ and p(e) is strictly concave, (7) is strictly decreasing at S = 0 for all
ec. Therefore, the TLO will set S = 0.
237 Appendix B: Survey Data
The business survey was designed to be answered by individuals actively engaged in
executing licenses, options, and/or sponsored research agreements with universities be-
tween 1993-1997. We received responses from 112 business units that had licensed-in
university inventions. Firms in our sample accounted for at least 15% of the license
agreements and 17% of sponsored research agreements reported by AUTM in 1997.
Seventy-nine ¯rms in the sample responded to a question on the top ¯ve universities
with whom they had contractual agreements. The 85 universities mentioned include
35 of the top 50 universities in terms of industry sponsored research and 40 of the top
50 licensing universities in the 1997 AUTM Survey. The majority of respondents were
employed by small ¯rms, with 46% answering for ¯rms with less than one-hundred
employees and 17% for ¯rms with more than one hundred but less than ¯ve hun-
dred employees. In terms of industry segments, 31% of the respondents identi¯ed
pharmaceuticals as the main industry in which their ¯rm operated, 36% indicated
biotechnology and medical devices as their main industry, and 33% indicated other
industries. 91% of the sample conducted some R&D in-house. On average, 37% of
the R&D conducted in-house was basic or discovery research, 44% was new product
development, and 18% was process improvement. Finally, many of the ¯rms in the
business survey are not publicly traded, which precludes the usual tests for selectivity
bias. As reported in Thursby and Thursby (2004), we used an alternative approach
of comparing data on respondents with that of the general population reported in the
AUTM survey as well as our earlier university survey. Other details of survey design


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Variable Mean Min Max
SMALL 0.39 0 1
CONSULTING 59.31 0 100
DISTANCE 788.24 6 1770
MILESTONE IMPORT* 3.39 1 5
PROOF 34.31 0 100
PROTOTYPE 40.83 0 100
SPON RESEARCH 43.11 0 100
Table 4: Summary Statistics. Regressions are based on deviations from individual
means.
Variable Odds ratio t-Stat Odds ratio t-Stat
SPON RESEARCH 0.884 ¡2:10¤¤ 0.878 ¡2:43¤¤
DISTANCE 0.996 ¡2:24¤¤ 0.996 ¡2:10¤¤
MILESTONE IMPORT 8.236 2:42¤¤ 8.484 2:40¤¤
SMALL 28.263 1.55 29.492 1.54
PROOF 0.994 ¡0:25
PROTOTYPE 1.027 0:74 1.032 1:05
No. Observations 36 36
R-Square 0.304 0.247
¤¤ Signi¯cant at the 5% level.
Table 5: Instrumental variables results for consulting.
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